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We must reduce our dependencies [on Russia]. We have seen how vulnerable they make us. Energy, microchips, rare earths—we need to diversify and secure our supply chains.

Ursula Gertrud von der Leyen

Speech on EU industrial and economic resilience, 2022 · Checked on 1 March 2026
We must reduce our dependencies [on Russia]. We have seen how vulnerable they make us. Energy, microchips, rare earths—we need to diversify and secure our supply chains.

Analysis

The claim aligns with multiple EU policy initiatives launched in 2022, including **REPowerEU** (to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027), the **European Chips Act** (to bolster semiconductor self-sufficiency), and the **Critical Raw Materials Act** (to secure supply chains for rare earths). Von der Leyen’s framing of these dependencies as a vulnerability mirrors the EU’s post-Ukraine invasion risk assessments, where overreliance on Russian gas (40% of EU imports pre-war) and Chinese-dominated rare earth supply chains (98% for some materials) were flagged as strategic weaknesses. No credible counterevidence undermines the statement’s core assertion.

Background

The statement was made amid the **2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine**, which exposed the EU’s energy dependency risks (e.g., gas supply cuts) and accelerated pre-existing plans to diversify. The EU had already identified **semiconductor shortages** (exacerbated by pandemic disruptions) and **rare earth monopolies** (e.g., China’s control over 60% of global production) as economic security threats in its 2021 **Strategic Compass** and 2020 **Industrial Strategy**.

Verdict summary

Ursula von der Leyen’s 2022 statement accurately reflects the EU’s documented strategic priorities to reduce dependency on Russia, particularly in energy, microchips, and rare earths, as evidenced by policy actions and official communications that year.

Sources consulted

— European Commission (2022). *REPowerEU Plan*. [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en)
— European Commission (2022). *Proposal for a European Chips Act*. [https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-chips-act](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-chips-act)
— European Commission (2023). *Critical Raw Materials Act: Securing Supply Chains*. [https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en](https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en)
— Eurostat (2022). *EU Trade in Goods with Russia*. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20220311-1](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20220311-1)
— European External Action Service (2021). *Strategic Compass*. [https://eeas.europa.eu/strategic-compass_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/strategic-compass_en)